New C.D. Howe report argues the Bank's 2026 framework renewal missed a chance to draw a clear line
The Bank of Canada should not be responsible for solving Canada's housing affordability crisis and a new report argues the November 2026 renewal of its monetary policy framework was a missed opportunity to say so explicitly.
Published November 17, 2026, by the C.D. Howe Institute, Staying on Target: Housing and the Bank of Canada's Monetary Policy Framework concludes that while housing is an unavoidable input into monetary policy decisions, it should not become a formal policy objective.
The report's authors - Jeremy Kronick, President and CEO of the C.D. Howe Institute; Steve Ambler, David Dodge Chair in Monetary Policy at C.D. Howe and professeur émérite at the Université du Québec à Montréal; and Thorsten Koeppl, Fellow-in-Residence at C.D. Howe and professor at Queen's University in Kingston - argue that the Bank lacks the tools to address structural housing challenges and that any attempt to do so would force it to pick winners among competing constituencies.
What the 2026 renewal decided and what it left out
On November 5, 2026, the Bank of Canada and the Government of Canada renewed their monetary policy framework agreement, re-establishing the 2 per cent inflation target as the Bank's sole objective. Housing and affordability were notably absent from the formal mandate - a decision the C.D. Howe authors welcome, though one they believe did not go far enough.
The report recommends that forthcoming background documentation clarify the point directly, stating that the Bank should not be held responsible for resolving structural problems in the housing market that lead to affordability challenges.
Housing had been among the most contested questions in the consultation process leading up to the renewal. According to the Bank of Canada, participants in community conversations expressed a clear desire for action on the housing crisis, with priorities split across labour groups, younger Canadians, older homeowners, and Indigenous communities - each wanting something different from the central bank.
The Bank faced pressure from investors, developers, existing homeowners, and all three levels of government to keep interest rates low to ease affordability, an expectation the report's authors argue the central bank cannot and should not try to meet.
As Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Rogers observed in October 2026 remarks to the Greater Victoria Chamber of Commerce and CFA Society Victoria: "It feels a bit like a trap. Higher prices make housing less affordable and leave many households with less room for everything else. Lower prices weigh on consumer confidence, wealth and economic growth. This is the heart of the housing affordability dilemma and why it's so hard to fix."
Why monetary policy is the wrong tool for housing
The scale of Canada's housing challenge makes the temptation to involve the central bank understandable.
According to Statistics Canada (2026), economic activity related to residential housing investment - which represents roughly 25 per cent of national wealth - added $152 billion, or 4.7 per cent, to Canada's GDP in 2025. The OECD (2025) reports that Canadians spend about 26 per cent of their total expenditures on housing, while mortgage debt makes up approximately 75 per cent of total household debt, which stood at nearly 180 per cent of disposable income in the first quarter of 2026.
However, the report's core argument is that the Bank of Canada has only one main policy instrument (the overnight rate) and that applying it to housing would require trade-offs that compromise its inflation mandate.
The authors cite economist Jan Tinbergen's principle that successfully achieving multiple independent policy objectives requires at least an equal number of policy instruments; with one tool and competing goals, trade-offs are inevitable.
The report also highlights the fundamental conflict of interest built into any housing mandate. Different groups want entirely different outcomes: labour groups want lower rents; younger Canadians want lower purchase prices; older Canadians, for whom housing forms a significant part of their retirement portfolio, want prices to stay high; developers and investors want lower rates to support construction; and Indigenous groups are concerned primarily with housing quality on reserves. Any direct action by the Bank to address affordability would favour one group over another.
How the housing market shapes monetary policy decisions
The report does not argue that the Bank should ignore housing, only that it should not target it.
Housing affects monetary policy through three key channels: financing costs, asset valuations, and borrowing capacity. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) estimated, according to research cited in the report, that rate hikes following the post-COVID inflation surge decreased housing starts in 2023 by approximately 10 to 15 per cent.
Housing also directly affects measured inflation. The shelter component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) includes rented accommodation, utilities, and homeownership costs including mortgage interest. This creates a complication: when the Bank raises rates to fight inflation, the mortgage interest cost component of CPI rises simultaneously, causing CPI to overstate inflation during tightening cycles.
The report argues for refining how the Bank accounts for this dynamic - not for giving housing an explicit target.
The authors note that since 2006, approximately 45 per cent of all Bank of Canada opening statements, remarks, and speeches (306 out of 673) have explicitly referred to housing, reflecting the sector's unavoidable role in monetary policy analysis.
The right tools for a structural problem
The C.D. Howe report is clear that Canada's housing challenges are structural. House prices in major Canadian cities have long outpaced those in other OECD countries, a pattern the authors attribute to regulatory impediments to construction, zoning restrictions, development charges, demographic pressures, and the absence of attractive secondary cities that might otherwise distribute demand.
These are problems, the report argues, that fiscal and regulatory policy are far better suited to address. Federal, provincial, and municipal governments are better positioned to design affordability policies - the federal government has established Build Canada Homes and expanded CMHC's financing tools, while provinces such as Ontario have moved to lower development charges and municipalities have relaxed zoning restrictions.
The report recommends that the Bank's soon-to-be-released background documentation for the renewal take the opportunity the joint announcement missed: explicitly stating that the Bank cannot address structural affordability issues without compromising its inflation target, while making clear that housing remains a key variable the Bank naturally considers when setting monetary policy to achieve 2 per cent inflation over the medium term.
As the C.D. Howe authors conclude: the housing sector is an important input into monetary policy decisions, but it is not - and should not be - a target of monetary policy.